Frege, Husserl & Sentential Reference
[From Introduction to Phenomenology by Dermot Moran.] In his discussion of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Moran mentions off-hand, “Of course, Frege held the strange view that all true sentences have the same reference, namely the true, whereas for Husserlthe references of sentences will be the state of affairs that they affirm as holding.”
I need to look into Frege’s view, but this practice—though a perhaps cumbersome, idiosyncratic way of thinking about true sentences—seems to be rigorous in a way that forces one to think of the metaphysics underlying any utterance at all. This sounds to me more Platonic than I remember any of Frege’s writings to be, though.
I concede that there certainly is a sense in which when I state any true sentence, then it refers ultimately to The True, but it does so by-way-of that circumstance or thing I posit. There has to be something I’m not seeing: it seems either redundant to say that each true statement has as its reference the true—or indolent not to affirm it.
2 Responses to “Frege, Husserl & Sentential Reference”
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Shandi Says:
May 2nd, 2007 at 16:38:12Hmm, I really like the train of thought this is opening up. Either way, the whole way of looking at it seems very un-post-modern (a word which I would certainly suggest we do NOT coin, if we can help it). I like, and agree with at a gut level without having decided if I can justify it, the concept of language as necesarrily referring to some more or less objective reality, more than or in addition to expressing my own subjective consciousness.
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The Mango Thief Says:
May 9th, 2007 at 18:05:16It is not clear to me that true statements must reference “The True”.
It seems to me that there must be some intent. Some statements are made with the intention of being true, but are not. Some statements are meant to be lies but are not.
I once had a conversation with an guy whose position was that Eve lied to Adam when she gave him the fruit of knowledge to eat. He stipulated that Eve believed that there was no harm in eating the apple. I asked if she believed that she was telling the truth was her statement a lie or simply an untruth. He said it was a lie. That any statement that was not true was a lie. In his mind mistakes and errors did not exist. If what you said was correct it was the truth, if it was wrong it was a lie.
I think Frege is bringing the same (befuddled) thought process to the table.
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Michael Says:
June 28th, 2007 at 18:06:13Thank you both for your comments!
Intention has its purpose, of course, but that purpose (ultimately subjective) I think is secondary to the truth value of a given statement, regardless of personal intent (i.e., objective truth). The difference here is semantic: if I “lie” to you but my statement actually makes reference to a truth, that statement is true regardless of what I “meant.” You may call me a liar and nevertheless uphold the truth of the thing said, since one references the subjective, the other the objective.
Your mention of the Adam & Eve discussion seems to agree with the above statement.
But if I understand him, Frege is taking it a step farther by saying that statements which partake of an objective truth, even though they be lies from an intentional/subjective standpoint, all have something in common, viz., that they all partake of Truth. This is the same as saying that all true statements make reference to something more fundamental than the mere particulars of circumstance which they happen to accurately reference. Frege would therefore refute your friend’s subjectivism in the same way you have.
May 2nd, 2007 at 16:38:12
Hmm, I really like the train of thought this is opening up. Either way, the whole way of looking at it seems very un-post-modern (a word which I would certainly suggest we do NOT coin, if we can help it). I like, and agree with at a gut level without having decided if I can justify it, the concept of language as necesarrily referring to some more or less objective reality, more than or in addition to expressing my own subjective consciousness.
May 9th, 2007 at 18:05:16
It is not clear to me that true statements must reference “The True”.
It seems to me that there must be some intent. Some statements are made with the intention of being true, but are not. Some statements are meant to be lies but are not.
I once had a conversation with an guy whose position was that Eve lied to Adam when she gave him the fruit of knowledge to eat. He stipulated that Eve believed that there was no harm in eating the apple. I asked if she believed that she was telling the truth was her statement a lie or simply an untruth. He said it was a lie. That any statement that was not true was a lie. In his mind mistakes and errors did not exist. If what you said was correct it was the truth, if it was wrong it was a lie.
I think Frege is bringing the same (befuddled) thought process to the table.
June 28th, 2007 at 18:06:13
Thank you both for your comments!
Intention has its purpose, of course, but that purpose (ultimately subjective) I think is secondary to the truth value of a given statement, regardless of personal intent (i.e., objective truth). The difference here is semantic: if I “lie” to you but my statement actually makes reference to a truth, that statement is true regardless of what I “meant.” You may call me a liar and nevertheless uphold the truth of the thing said, since one references the subjective, the other the objective.
Your mention of the Adam & Eve discussion seems to agree with the above statement.
But if I understand him, Frege is taking it a step farther by saying that statements which partake of an objective truth, even though they be lies from an intentional/subjective standpoint, all have something in common, viz., that they all partake of Truth. This is the same as saying that all true statements make reference to something more fundamental than the mere particulars of circumstance which they happen to accurately reference. Frege would therefore refute your friend’s subjectivism in the same way you have.